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I argue that the implementation of the Department of Education's "Values in Education" initiative would be problematic without also
invoking procedures of deliberation. Unlike the identified "values" on their own  i.e. equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness,
accountability, and honour, as announced by the Department of Education  deliberative procedures offer the possibility to deepen a sense
of citizenship in schools. My contention is that the "Values in Education" initiative has a better chance of cultivating citizenship in schools
if enacted commensurate with the notion of deliberative democracy.   
What constitutes deliberative democracy?
Theoretically defined, deliberative democracy refers to the notion that
legitimate political decision making emanates from the public delibe
ration of citizens. In other words, as a normative account of political
decision making, deliberative democracy evokes ideals of rational
legislation, participatory politics and civic self governance, that is, "it
presents an ideal of political autonomy based on practical reasoning of
citizens" (Bohman & Rehg, 1997:ix). The upshot of such a theoretical
grounding of democracy based on public deliberation presupposes that
citizens or their representatives engage in reasoning together about the
laws and policies that they ought to pursue as a political community,
that is to say, to bring about the "use of public reason" (Bohman &
Rehg, 1997:x). The theoretical critiques of liberal democratic models
such as democratic elitism, democratic egalitarianism and demarchism
and the revival of participatory politics developed during the 1970s.
Only in the 1980s did the concept of deliberative democracy begin to
assume some form of theoretical identity with the ideas of Joseph
Bessette, who first used the concept as a critique against elitist inter
pretations of the American Constitution (Bohman & Rehg, 1987:xiii).
Since then, several deliberative theorists have endeavoured to develop
plausible conceptions of deliberative democracy. For the purposes of
this article I shall explain two salient theoretical statements of the con
cept, with reference to the ideas of Habermas and Benhabib.  
First, Habermas (1997) offers an account of democracy which
places practical reasoning amongst citizens at the core of political
discourse. For Habermas, practical reasoning guides an understanding
of political practice in terms of self determination or self realisation
and rational discourse (Habermas, 1997:39). This practice of practical
reasoning for Habermas empowers citizens to decide upon the rules
and manner of their living together in a self determined way, thereby
producing co operative life practices "centred in conscious (and ra
tional) political will formation" (Habermas, 1997:41). In short, Haber
mas contends that a politics radically situated in this world should be
justifiable on the basis of reason (Habermas, 1997:41). Moreover, for
Habermas a democratic legislature decides by consensus at the level
of inter subjective deliberation guided by argumentation, which in turn
dismisses programmed decisions in the public sphere (Habermas,
1997:57). In the event that consensus seems unrealisable and political
deadlock imminent, Habermas proposes majority decision making as
"a conditional consensus" based on conditional rational discussion and
argumentation (Habermas, 1997:47). But such a conditional consensus
does not require minorities to abandon their aims; rather, they are
required to forego the practical application of their convictions, until
they succeed in better establishing their reasons and procuring the
necessary number of affirmative votes (Habermas, 1997:47).
Second, for Benhabib the deliberative model insists upon the
openness of the agenda of public debate. In other words, she argues
that legitimacy in complex democratic societies must result from the
free and unconstrained public deliberation of all citizens about matters
of common concern, and not just about a specific subject matter in
volving constitutional issues and questions of basic justice (Benhabib,
1996:68).  For Benhabib reason is always situated in a context that can
never render transparent all the cultural and social conditions that give
rise to it. Hence, for Benhabib deliberative democracy does not restrict
the agenda of public conversation, but rather encourages discourse
which integrates the public and the private, as well as being more in
terested in the ways in which political processes interact with cultural
and social contexts. 
Hence, deliberative democracy involves open, uncoerced delibe
ration on the educational (political) issues at stake with the aim of ar
riving at rationally agreed upon judgments. Combining the ideas of
Habermas and Benhabib, one finds that notions of rationality, con
sensus, persuasion through the "better argument" and culturally or
socially embedded deliberation constitute the discourse of deliberative
democracy. In this article I want to show how such an understanding
of deliberative democracy, which considers deliberative arguments
grounded in consensus, persuasion, reasonableness and  "fair minded"
judgements, can be used to cultivate a sense of citizenship in learners
 a situation which the "Values in Education" project of the DoE can
not accomplish on its own. This brings me to a cursory account of the
"Values in Education" initiative of the DoE.
The Department of Education's Tirisano project: "Values in
Education" initiative and its limitations
The Department of Education (DoE) advocates nine priorities for its
Tirisano ("Working together") programme: making provincial systems
work by making co operative governance work; breaking the back of
illiteracy among adults and youths within five years; schools must
become centres of community and cultural life; physical degradation
in schools has to be ended; the professional quality of the teaching
force has to be developed; the success of active learning has to be en
sured through outcomes based education; a vibrant further education
and training system should be created to equip youths and adults to
meet the next century's social and economic needs; a rational, seamless
higher education system has to be implemented; and the HIV/AIDS
emergency has to be dealt with urgently and purposefully in and
through the education and training system (DoE, 1999:13). These
priorities (it is hoped) will contribute to the broader process of social
and economic development through focusing on two central goals: (1)
developing people for citizenship; and (2) developing skills for em
ployment (DoE, 1999:14). My focus in this article is to find out whe
ther "Values in Education" as propounded through the Tirisano edu
cational campaign can in fact be cultivated without procedures of
deliberation which can in turn lead to a heightened form of citizenship.
In October 2000 a school based research project was conducted
by a consortium of research organisations led by the Witwatersrand
University Education Policy Unit to explore the way that educators,
learners and parents think and talk about "Values in Education".
Ninety seven schools across five provinces were chosen by provincial
officials to represent the range of schools in their province. Ques
tionnaires were administered to all the educators and principals.
Three hour participatory workshops were conducted separately with
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learners, educators and parents in 13 schools  (DoE, 2000b:4). After
a process of research and debate, this working group presented a report
on its findings and recommendations entitled "Values, Education and
Democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in Education" in
April 2000.  According to the Report of the Working Group, the
democratic Constitution and Bill of Rights accepted in 1996 provide
the frame of reference for a democratic educational philosophy.  The
key elements of such an educational philosophy include: to develop
the intellectual abilities and critical faculties among all children and
young adults; to emphasise inclusiveness. All learners, irrespective of
their backgrounds, should be actively included in school life; and to
provide learners with the tools to solve the many problems encoun
tered in life. In this Report they advocated the promotion of equity,
tolerance, multilingualism, openness, accountability and social honour
in our schools, and suggested a range of ways in which schools could
begin to promote these values (DoE, 2000b:4).  
I shall now briefly tease out the meanings of these "values" as ex
plained in the Interim Research Report and simultaneously identify
some of the gaps related to implementation. This is necessary because
I shall later explore the reasons why the implementation of these six
"Values in Education" cannot be realised without procedures of delibe
ration; they will therefore not necessarily contribute towards cultiva
ting citizenship in schools.
Equity
According to the Interim Research Report, the educational policy from
the previous apartheid regime left the majority of South Africans,
mostly blacks, with serious inequalities in education. They were sub
jected to an education which prepared them only for unskilled labour.
Mathematics and science were offered in exceptional instances. The
teachers were mostly unqualified and financial assistance from the
state was minimal compared to that for whites. The consequence of
this unequal system was a desperately under educated black African
population. What equity means is that, in order to redress the inequa
lities of the past, all sectors of society, business, government and civil
society need to support the learning environment in the way that they
allocate resources, set priorities and define an ethos. They need to
invest in the infrastructure and quality of teaching in schools situated
in the most disadvantaged areas of our country (DoE, 2000b:4 10). My
contention is that having various sectors of society "support the
learning environment" in terms of allocating resources, setting priori
ties and defining an ethos is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
to cultivate the intellectual, critical, problem solving and co operative
capacities of learners, that is to say, developing their sense of citi
zenship.
For instance, government  through the Ministry of Education
 can "support the learning environment" in terms of allocating re
sources, setting priorities and defining an ethos through policy formu
lation and promulgation. However, this does not necessarily mean that
such a policy would be implemented or enacted by those teachers,
learners and communities whose legitimate interests might be advan
ced through policy. The implies that the value of equity by itself does
not seem to be an enabling condition to redress the inequalities of the
past, as well as cultivating a sense of citizenship in learners. The point
I am making is that equity per se does not seem to be a value that can
actually motivate people to cultivate a sense of citizenship, i.e. deve
loping the intellectual, critical, problem solving and co operative capa
cities of, in this instance, learners. In the first place, people have to be
willing and co operative in order to ensure that equitable strategies to
redress past inequalities are implemented; people need to engage deli
beratively with one another about the reasons and merits of equitable
or just practices. They first need to possess a sense of citizenship
which can spark in them a willingness to achieve equity or to enact
equitable education policies.  In this regard Young (2001) states that
the mere existence of equitable policies does not guarantee democratic
change. I shall argue later that in order to cultivate a sense of citizen
ship in learners, which can ensure that they become intellectual, criti
cal and co operative problem solvers, we require of them to engage
with others in deliberative practices. In turn, a sense of citizenship can
lead to people becoming more intent on implementing equitable edu
cation policies; the process does not work the other way round, as
propagated by the "Values in Education" initiative.      
Tolerance
The Interim Research Report announces that tolerance does not simply
mean putting up with people who are different. Tolerance is explained
as entailing mutual understanding, reciprocal altruism and the active
appreciation of the value of human difference (DoE, 2000a:22). The
working group contends that the value of tolerance is essential in ma
naging and supporting the linguistic, religious, cultural and national
diversity of the South African community of learners and teachers. For
the working group the value of tolerance could also be promoted out
side of the classroom, in extra mural activities such as the performing
arts and sport (DoE, 2000a:22 26). I agree with the working group that
mutual understanding, reciprocal altruism and the recognition of hu
man difference are crucial to cultivating a sense of citizenship in lear
ners. However, learners can mutually understand one another's diverse
perspectives, demonstrate altruism and recognise one another's differ
ences, without this necessarily meaning that they would actually
become intellectual, critical and co operative problem solvers. My
contention is that critical and co operative learners also challenge one
another, that is, question, interrogate, threaten and provoke one an
other in terms of ideas, perspectives and points of view. In this way
critical and co operative learners develop respect for one another. The
point I am making is that the working group seems to espouse a notion
of tolerance whereby diverse learners have to mutually agree on
matters in an altruistic way. I challenge this conception as such a no
tion of tolerance would instil in learners attitudes of compliance and
uncritical co operation. Therefore, tolerance as articulated by the wor
king group does not seem to hold the potential to engender a sense of
citizenship in learners whereby they become intellectual, critical and
co operative problem solvers. My contention is that learners also need
to be familiar with (and practise) deliberation in the quest to become
potential democratic citizens. Put differently, they need to become
deliberative democrats. 
Multilingualism
The Constitution of 1996 granted equality of status to 11 official
languages: Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga,
isiNdebele, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Afrikaans, and English. English has
become the national language of politics and record in the new South
Africa. It remains the language of diplomacy and international com
merce. The language in education policy of the Department of Educa
tion recommended in 1997 that learners should study through the
medium of either their home language, or through English and their
home language. Two values are promoted in the area of language:
firstly, the importance of studying in the language one knows best, or
as this is popularly referred to, mother tongue education; and secondly,
the fostering of multilingualism. South Africa is a multilingual coun
try. In order to be a good South African citizen, one needs to be at
least bilingual, but preferably trilingual (DoE, 2000a:30 33). The
question arises as to whether multilingualism holds the possibility for
learners to become intellectual, critical and co operative problem sol
vers  to become good citizens. Of course, mastery of the language(s)
is one way of establishing conditions for learners to communicate
more effectively. But then, merely having a conversation in one's mo
ther tongue with another person does not necessarily guarantee con
structive engagement. People can talk to one another, yet they might
still be talking past one another, despite having multilingual skills.
However, what is required for people to engage meaningfully in con
versation is not that they be multilingual, but rather that conversation
adheres to procedures of rational deliberation (irrespective of lan
guage).  I shall argue later that learners need to be familiar with (and
practise) procedures of deliberation in order to become critical and




The Interim Research Report announces that South Africa's schooling
system has the responsibility of refining the intellectual development
of every learner in an environment that is stimulating and emotionally
supportive. It also has the responsibility to provide an approach to
solving problems that will be useful throughout the life cycle. The
report also stresses that most South Africans have been bereft of a
strong debating culture as a result of an over emphasis on rote learning
and the slavish repetition of information, both of which practices were
rewarded by a bureaucratic examination system, where asking ques
tions was discouraged and where an authoritarian attitude to learning
and social conduct was expected of teachers. The Report posits that the
ability to ask penetrating questions is a skill that has to be encouraged
and developed, and that the ability to debate adds value to the quality
of public understanding and the public discourse. It is in this context
that the Report principally associates openness with the value of being
open and receptive to new ideas; the ability to ask good and pene
trating questions; and being willing to debate so as to arrive at quality
decisions (DoE, 2000a:36 39). 
I agree with such an understanding of openness since a question
ing and reflective attitude on the part of learners and citizens is what
this country is definitely in need of. What concerns me, however, is
that the Report does not clearly articulate how learners (citizens) can
achieve "quality decisions". Is a quality decision anything people agree
with/on? Does a quality decision mean that the decision in point has
the support of the majority of learners? I contend that a quality de
cision does not necessarily mean that anything goes, because that
would be tantamount to relativistic chaos. Yet I am not entirely con
vinced that majority decision making always produces the better
decision. The majority of learners can vote in favour of democratic
decision making to be abandoned in favour of totalitarian decision
making, which does not necessarily make the majoritarian decision a
good one. Consequently the Department of Education's value of
"openness" does not sufficiently clarify how quality decisions in class
room practice can be achieved. I contend that this can best be achieved
through procedures of deliberation, which in turn can cultivate citizen
ship (more than the value of openness) in South African classrooms.
 
Accountability
The Interim Research Report justifies the "value" of accountability in
terms of teaching being a vocation  a mission in life and not just an
other job. And exercising that responsibility requires a strong sense of
commitment on the part of teachers and learners. Thus, according to
the Report, "every role player should be accountable". The Report
states that children and young adults are the responsibility of parents
and teachers, who are in turn accountable to school governing bodies
and the educational authorities, which are in turn accountable to the
citizens of a democratic society (DoE, 2000a:42 45). Notably absent
from the Department of Education's understanding of accountability
is the idea that accountability does not only mean that teachers and
learners need to have a strong sense of commitment, but also that tea
chers and learners need to provide a justification for what they are
doing. This accountability can only be expressed according to justi
fiable reasons as to why teachers and learners say or do certain things
or not. By implication, accountability is linked to justifications asso
ciated with providing reasonable arguments for enacting certain educa
tive practices. The point I am making is that one can only be account
able if one's sense of commitment is linked to articulating a justifiable
defence of what one is doing. This makes accountability a kind of deli
berative practice which cannot be attained without articulating justi
fiable reasons for one's actions. It is such an understanding of ac
countability which I shall explore in more detail about procedures of
deliberation later on.   
Honour
The primary purpose of a school is undeniably to provide an environ
ment where teaching and learning take place. The Interim Research
Report posits that part of the learning experience involves an anti
cipation of the responsibilities of adulthood, including those of citi
zenship in a democracy. Before 1994 there was by definition no
common loyalty to the state or to national symbols. The state and its
symbols were biased in favour of a White minority. The Constitution
and Bill of Rights of the new democratic South Africa envisages a
citizenry with a sense of honour and identity as South Africans.
Schools are expected to teach learners the national anthem, the
significance of the flag and the recently unveiled coat of arms. Also
recommended in the Report is the learning of a pledge of allegiance
which should be declaimed at school assemblies so that we can be
reminded of the fundamental values to which South Africans in a
democracy aspire to achieve. The following text illustrates what the
working group feels ought to be conveyed, and it invites responses
from the public:
I promise to be loyal to my country, South Africa, and to do my
best to promote its welfare and the well being of all its citizens.
I promise to show self respect in all that I do and to respect all of
my fellow citizens and all of our various traditions. Let us work
for peace, friendship and reconciliation and heal the scars left by
past conflicts, and let us build a common destiny together (DoE,
2000a:48 50).
Ideals of this envisaged pledge of allegiance would be difficult to con
test and I would go along with most of what has been expressed in it.
Yet to "build a common destiny together" as one of the main objec
tives of showing a sense of honour would be somewhat difficult to
achieve without also invoking procedures of deliberation. It is there
fore to a discussion of procedures of deliberation that I now return,
because it would be difficult to realise any of the above mentioned six
"values" in schools if they do not also encourage deliberative practices.
Closing the gaps: moving towards procedures of
deliberation 
I explained above what constitutes deliberative democracy. Despite
their different views on deliberative practices, Rawls and Benhabib
generally agree on one specific issue: political (and educational) pro
cesses involve more than self interested competition governed by bar
gaining and aggregative mechanisms. In short, deliberation involves
open, uncoerced deliberative procedures in relation to the political and
educational issues at stake, with the aim of arriving at rationally agreed
upon judgments. I shall now examine these procedures of deliberation
and their implications for education.
My argument that procedures of deliberation  with specific
reference to the seminal ideas of Taylor (1985) about rationality,
which best elucidate the ideal of better and reasonable argumentation
which can lead to a heightened form of citizenship  have four main
normative elements: (a) the view that rational articulation of arguments
is a valuable part of human agency, (b) the view that political formula
tions have to be consistent and without contradiction, (c) the view that
everyone should in principle be attuned to "the order of things", and
(d) the view that relevant arguments need to be advanced in inter
subjective processes of rational deliberation. I shall now elucidate
these normative conceptions of better and reasonable argumentation.
Rational articulation 
By "rational articulation" I mean the individual's readiness to express
and provide reasons in support of his or her self interpretations and
judgments in a lucid, coherent and logical manner. Support for such
a view of rational articulation can be found in Taylor's (1985:137) idea
of rationality:
(Rational articulation) seems to involve being able to say clearly
what the matter in question is ... (in such a way that) we have a
rational grasp of something when we can articulate it, that means,
distinguish and lay out the different features of the matter in
perspicuous order.
In short, citizens engaged in public deliberation along the lines of
democratic decision making should articulate their preferences, i.e.
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supply well ordered reasons in support of their subjectively held views
and judgments to others. In doing so, they open up their subjectively
held educational views and judgments to rational challenge by others.
In other words, individuals do not impose their "private reasons" on
the democratic process without justifying and subjecting them to any
form of public critical scrutiny. Bohman (1996:5) emphasises the im
portance of subjecting the rational articulation of deliberative demo
cracy to public scrutiny for by arguing that it is crucial for citizens and
their representatives to test their interests and reason in a public forum
before they come to a decision. This implies that the deliberative pro
cess demands that citizens (teachers and students) justify their deci
sions and opinions by appealing to common interests or by arguing in
terms of reasons that "all could accept" in public debate. The point is
that the ensuing collective decision should in some sense be justified
by public reasons, that is, persuasive reasons acceptable to everyone
participating in the process of deliberation.    
What follows from the above is that, unless majority decision
makers can provide well ordered reasons and sufficient justification
for their particular evaluations, which must be open to public scrutiny
by others, rejecting minority views on the grounds of quantification
only seems to be antecedent to, and forever removed from, the process
of deliberation. 
Consistent political formulations 
My discussion of deliberation also aims to show why consistent
educational formulations constitute part of a convincing defence for
better and reasonable argumentation. It makes no sense for individuals
in educational processes to articulate their self interpretations and
judgments with ambivalence and contradictions. The beneficial effects
of rational articulation can accrue only if the individuals concerned
articulate their educational preferences with consistency in deliberative
practices. Taylor (1985:137) makes the point that to strive for rationa
lity in deliberative practices is to be engaged in articulation, in finding
the appropriate formulations. Yet he also invokes the understanding
that a standard intrinsic to the activity of formulating is that the formu
lations be consistent. Put differently, nothing is clearly articulated if
it contains contradictory formulations which makes "consistency
plainly a necessary condition of rationality" (Taylor, 1985:137).
Once again the argument for majoritarian preference in educa
tional deliberation becomes insufficient because, in defence of the
better argument, majority views might not always be consistent and
unambiguous formulations. Absolute majority preference provides no
criterion for assessing the quality of arguments; rather, consistent
educational formulations provide such a criterion. Rational argumenta
tion in this sense means that everyone is deemed capable of making
informed and consistent judgments on educational matters, or more
precisely, that no one's consistent and reasonably articulated argu
ments should be discounted on grounds of majority or minority pre
ferences. The point is, every citizen's contribution in deliberative
practices, if consistently articulated, must be seen to be worthy of
consideration. Bohman (1996:7) states that deliberative democracy
accords with the beliefs and actions of a rational character insofar as
they can be supported publicly by good reasons. Furthermore, the
exchange of reasons takes place in "a discourse in which participants
strive to reach agreement solely on the basis of the better argument,
free of coercion and open to all competent speakers".   
Attunement with the "order of things"
By being deliberative, individuals also have to be attuned with the
"order of things", in this instance, educational decisions, procedures
and issues of public policy. In other words, individuals intent on
producing the better argument have to be engaged in an informed (i.e.
proceeding with understanding and impartiality) and perceptive way
with his or her socio political context, and with other persons for the
common good of this context. Taylor (1985:142) establishes a con
nection between the idea of achieving the better argument and being
attuned to the "order of things":
We do not understand (articulate the better argument) without
understanding our place in it, because we are part of this order.
And we cannot understand the order and our place in it without
loving it, without seeing its goodness, which is what I want to
call being in attunement with it.
However, does being part of the "order of things" necessarily mean
that every individual should directly participate in deliberative prac
tices? I do not think that being part of the "order of things" on the basis
of political participation implies obtaining the direct consent of every
individual on every issue. Being attuned to educational issues does not
mean that every learner must be directly involved in the affairs of
education. Certainly in South African classrooms direct participation
on the part of every learner would be unfeasible, since the emphasis on
direct democracy would be more on getting the mass of students in
volved in educational decision making rather than reflecting on the
reasonableness of the decisions themselves. Representative educational
structures dedicated solely to the debate on educational matters of
public concern can counteract the difficulties associated with direct
participatory democracy. To say that every learner should participate
directly in educational deliberation is to assume (a) that individuals
only have subjective beliefs, aspirations, and educational values, which
ought to shape democratic practices; and (b) that there are no inter
subjective (common) meanings about educational discourse which
individuals might collectively share. I agree with Taylor (1985:36)
when he claims that people in any society have all sorts of beliefs and
attitudes which may be thought of as their individual beliefs and
attitudes, even if others share them. But what they do not own are the
meanings constitutive of educational discourse. For example, public
debate on educational matters is not just an arena where the pre
formed interests or views of people are fought out, culminating in a
majority vote. The point is that public debate is constituted by the
exchange of the inter subjective meanings or a set of common terms
of reference such as for people to reasonably reflect on their views
during the process of deliberation, and for them to reach an agreement
on what educational decision should be made on the issues in ques
tion. These inter subjective meanings are rooted in the practice of
public debate and could not be the single property of individuals.
Taylor (1985:36) explains inter subjective meanings as follows: 
It is not just that the people in our society all or mostly have a
given set of ideas in their heads and subscribe to a given set of
goals. The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not
just in the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices
themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of
individual actions, but which are essentially modes of social rela
tion, of mutual action.
However, for teachers and learners to reach agreement among them
selves  thus attuning themselves to the "order of things"  does not
mean that educational decision making should be subjected to solely
to a majority vote. Why not? Reaching agreement entails disclosing a
sincere and rational way of securing "mutually respectful social
co operation" (Callan, 1998:62). Mutual social co operation implies
that teachers and learners have to respect each other and be sincere
about meeting each other half way, to compromise. Compromise, in
the words of Bohman (1996:89), "is all about coming to an accommo
dation or making concessions. It involves tradeoffs and balances of
interests  making concessions of one's own for equal ones by
others". The question can legitimately be asked how such a compro
mise could be established and ensured. My argument is that teachers
and learners could temporarily come to an agreement based on
majoritarian decision making, but should also procedurally build into
the deliberative process a reflexivity principle which allows for the
public re examination of majoritarian decisions  what Benhabib
(1996:72) refers to as that reflexivity condition which allows abuses
and misapplications at the first level to be challenged at a second
meta level of discourse. Also, Gutman and Thompson (1996:43) argue
that deliberative processes help distinguish true moral disagreements
from agreements that could be resolved by "bargaining, negotiation or
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compromise" or by rational clarification. 
When teachers and learners in a public debate compromise, they
do not merely advance the position of their individual or group in
terests, but rather develop a shared willingness to make minimal use
of controversial empirical premises. For Bohman (1996:91), in a com
promise parties do not modify the framework to achieve unanimity, but
rather modify their conflicting interpretations of the framework so that
each can recognise the other's moral values and standards as part of it.
In other words, the framework is then common enough for each party
to continue to co operate and deliberate uncontroversially with the
other. Habermas (1996a:324) posits that reaching mutual understan
ding (compromise) through deliberative discourse guarantees that
issues, reasons and information are handled reasonably. Thus, to avoid
perpetual conflict, which may bring us nowhere, we need to develop
what Callan (1998:76) refers to as "a shared group interest in com
promise", a kind of shared loyalty that can push hard in the direction
of temporary agreement between teachers and learners who need to
respect each other, until educational decisions are again subjected to
reflexive re examination at another "meta level". 
In the context of pursuing  respectfully and non arbitrarily 
a deliberative discourse in a diverse South African classroom, we have
to develop "a shared group interest in compromise" which can prevent
us pushing toward convergent interpretations of education. Rather, we
(teachers and learners) need to develop compromising understandings
of education that can advance our shared interests in a diverse political
community. For this reason Habermas (1996a:331) makes the point
that in a deliberative democracy "all politically relevant collective
actors enjoy roughly equal opportunities to influence the decision
making processes that concern them; that the members of the orga
nisations determine the politics of pressure groups and parties (tea
chers and learners); and that the latter in turn are pushed by multiple
memberships into a readiness for compromise and the integration of
interests".  
In essence, deliberation involves what Habermas (1996a:322)
refers to as procedures of argumentation in which those taking part
justify their reasons with consistent and unambiguous political formu
lations. When a person is rational, he or she is in principle attuned to
"the order of things" in unconstrained inter subjective processes of
deliberation. In a Habermasian way, deliberation as "the centerpiece
of deliberative politics consists in a network of discourses and bar
gaining (compromising) that is supposed to facilitate the rational solu
tion of pragmatic, moral, and ethical questions" (Habermas, 1996b:
320). 
Thus far I have expounded upon procedures of deliberation with
respect to four main points: (a) the view that the rational articulation
of arguments is a valuable part of human agency, (b) the view that
educational formulations have to be consistent and without contra
diction, (c) the view that everyone should in principle be attuned to
"the order of things", and (d) the view that relevant arguments need to
be advanced in unconstrained inter subjective processes of rational
deliberation. I shall now explore why these procedures of deliberation
can also bring about caring, conversational justice and political rea
soning. In this way, I hope to show that deliberative procedures can
cultivate a sense of citizenship. 
First, the rational articulation of arguments in a Taylorian sense
brings into question the notion of justification. Teachers and learners
not only have to explain and justify their points of view, decisions or
choices, that is, possess an ability to logically construct and understand
arguments and their appropriateness to different educational contexts
(Raz, 1999:68 70), but should also care about making educational
arguments reasonable to other citizens. In other words, deliberation
should also have the effect whereby people develop the capacity to
reach their own justifiable conclusions or inferences to which they are
to be held accountable. And when people develop a deep sense of
accountability in this way, they can be said to have assumed a pro
found sense of citizenship, because the articulation and exchange of
educational arguments involving caring can be linked to citizenship 
a matter of cultivating in others the care to justify their actions and to
which they are to be held accountable for those actions. In this way the
rational articulation of arguments in the domain of the educational
sphere makes the idea of a citizenship possible.
Second, if deliberation involves the capacity of people to articu
late unambiguous educational arguments, then it has to invoke the idea
of conversational justice, which demands that they (teachers and
learners) produce coherent arguments to justify their points. Rawls's
(1993:220) idea of public reason, within which deliberation is embed
ded, is inextricably linked to "standards of correctness and criteria of
justification". In a Rawlsian sense "criteria of justification" not only
refer to an articulation of arguments without contradiction, but also "a
willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when
accommodations to their views should reasonably be made" (Rawls,
1993:217)  a matter of engaging in conversational justice as citizens.
By implication deliberation can engender conversational justice
through which citizens willingly justify their articulations to one
another. In short, deliberation has the potential to cultivate a sense of
citizenship. 
Third, if deliberation involves the capacity of people to be attuned
to "the order of things", then it means that teachers and learners have
to be engaged in an informed, perceptive and reflexive way with their
socio political context, and with other persons for the common good
of this context. Thus, the idea of "attunement with" one socio political
context invokes the idea of political reasoning, which holds that each
individual has to contribute "to the shared deliberations of the commu
nity in his or her own voice" (MacIntyre, 1999:140). Rawls (1993:
252) explains deliberative democracy in this same vein on the basis
that citizens in a society share in the political power they exercise over
one another, "when they engage in political advocacy in the public
forum, in political campaigns, for example, when they vote on those
fundamental questions". In other words, they are attuned to their
socio political context. What follows from this is that deliberation can
bring about political reasoning through which citizens share in inter
subjective (rational) deliberations with their socio political contexts.
In essence, deliberation can enact goods of citizenship (caring con
versational justice and political reasoning). 
Finally, the question arises: can deliberation in schools live up to
the demands of citizenship? One way is to persuade teachers and
learners to accept that the activities associated with participation and
deliberation are intrinsically rewarding. This Aristotelian view holds
that participation and deliberation are superior to private life involving
the family, work, religion and leisure, which most people often find
burdensome and sacrificial (Kymlicka, 2002:297). Most people, cer
tainly in South Africa, do not necessarily accept the intrinsic value of
participation and deliberation as rewarding, since they will find their
greatest joys and projects in other areas of life, including the family,
work, the arts or religion. If this were to be the case, and one has good
reason to believe it is, the least people could do to cultivate citizenship
would be to learn the social virtue of "civility" or "decency", since it
applies not only to educational activity, but primarily to our non
discriminatory actions in everyday life, on the street, in neighbourhood
shops, and in diverse institutions and forums of civil society such as
stores, corporations, churches, charities, support groups, unions and
families. Walzer (in Kymlicka, 2000:305) posits that the civility that
makes deliberation possible can only be learned in associational net
works of civil society. According to Glendon (1991:109) it is in volun
tary organisations of civil society, such as those mentioned above, that
human character, competence and the capacity for citizenship are
formed, for it is here that people internalise the idea of personal res
ponsibility and mutual obligation, and learn the voluntary self restraint
which is essential to responsible citizenship. However, Okin (1992:65)
posits that these associational networks of civil society can also teach
deference to authority and intolerance towards other faiths, prejudice
against other races, and male dominance over women, which do not




It seems clear that no single institution can be relied upon as the
exclusive "seedbed of civic virtue". Therefore I agree with Kymlicka
(2002:307), who argues that the virtues of citizenship can "best" be
learned in schools. In his words, "schools must teach children how to
engage in the kind of critical reasoning and moral perspective that
defines public reasonableness ... (and) promoting these sorts of virtues
is one of the fundamental justifications for mandatory education
(Kymlicka, 2002:307). Of course, historically, schools have often been
used to promote deference, chauvinism, xenophobia, and other illiberal
and undemocratic practices, but this does not detract from the fact that
schools can be reorganised, particularly in South Africa, to be effective
"seedbeds of civic virtues". According to Gutman (1987:30), education
for citizenship should inevitably involve equipping children with the
intellectual skills necessary for civility. 
Conclusion
The point about citizenship is that people (citizens) are required to act
responsibly. Citizens should not merely become involved in deli
beration and decision making, but they should also try to promote the
common good. For Miller (2000:83) promoting the common good
involves securing a set of equal rights for all citizens, to encourage
people to respect the rule of law, and to take active steps to defend the
rights of others, particular the least privileged. As I have argued, pro
cedures of deliberation seem to be an appropriate discourse within
which to cultivate such a notion of the common good. In short, pro
cedures of deliberation can frame a notion of citizenship which can
imbue in citizens (teachers and learners) the virtue of practising a
rational, consensus oriented deliberative discourse in a reasonable and
reflexive way. In this way, teachers and learners could enhance their
capacities as practical reasoners who deeply care about building a just,
equal and deliberative society, which in turn could make the successful
implementation of the DoE's "Values in Education" initiative highly
possible. 
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